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Capturing the Transplant: U.S.
Antitrust Law in the European
Union
Silvia Beltrametti*

ABSTRACT

The scholarly literature on the movement of legal norms
focuses almost exclusively on transfers from one jurisdiction to
another. It largely ignores transfers into new regulatory
regimes. Drawingon a case study of the transplantationof U.S.
antitrust law into the nascent entity that was to become the
European Community, and analyzing its evolution from a
public choice perspective, this Article suggests that transfers
into new regulatory regimes are more likely to be effective when
the lack of established institutions creates opportunities for
stakeholders. The endorsement of a new law will enable
stakeholders to influence its application and to capturepositions
of the regulatory agency in charge of its administration. An
enhanced understanding of this transplantand the impact of a
German stakeholder on the development of EU competition law
explains why, if today the European Union and the United
States investigate the same transaction, the competition law
standardsset by the European Union will prevail.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The wave of regional and global economic integration that
started in the 1950s with the formation of the European Community
(EC) called for the definition of supranational rules and policies to
regulate trade in newly integrated markets. ' Key among these
policies was the promotion of a competitive market, which promised
to attract capital inflows and spur economic growth. Familiarity with
competition law was, however, not widespread when the integration
movement started, and the negotiators of the newly formed EC had to
refer to the U.S. example, the only country that had a comprehensive
system of competition law in place at the time.2 The U.S. Sherman
Act thus became a model for the competition laws of the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the entity that laid the
foundations for the EC. 3 The definition of new rules through transfers
or imitation is by no means a new phenomenon in the scholarship on
integration, convergence, and, more generally, the movement of legal
norms, but this Article explores a different and underestimated angle
of this literature: the transfer of rules into new regulatory systems. 4
Drawing on the transfer of U.S. antitrust law to the EC, this Article
asks-how are transfers to new regulatory regimes different? How is
this difference relevant to the globalization of competition? To what
extent did U.S. antitrust law influence the formation of competition
policies in the European Union?

1.
See WALTER MATTLI, THE LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND
BEYOND 190 (1999).
2.
See ALAN D. NEALE & D. G. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAws OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 488 (1980).
3.
ECSC, European Coal and Steal Community. See discussion infra Section II.
4.
See generally ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAw (1985); KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAw (3d ed. 1998); Daniel
Berkowitz et al., The TransplantEffect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003) (exploring the
relationship between the way in which country receives its formal law and the
effectiveness of its legal institutions); Frank Dobbin et al., The Global Diffusion of
Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV.
SOC. 449 (2007); Nuno Garoupa & Anthony Ogus, A Strategic Interpretationof Legal
Transplants, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2006); Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal
Transplants, An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, INT'L REV. L. & ECON.,
March 1994; Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 429 (1997).
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These questions have become more and more relevant since
European antitrust authorities began making it increasingly difficult
for U.S. firms to operate in Europe. Over the past decade, the
European Commission has fined Microsoft more than $3 billion and
ordered the company to change the products it sold in Europe in
response to its antitrust abuses, even though U.S. authorities had
previously cleared such behavior. 5 Similarly, the European
Commission accused Google of abusing its dominance in the online
search market. 6 Whereas the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
dropped its charges against Google in 2013, the Commission's
investigation is ongoing, and it is causing much agitation in
Congress, since a recent resolution by the European Parliament
called for the "unbundling [of] search engines from other commercial
practices." 7 This would require Google to split its operations, which
would fundamentally alter the way Google operates in Europe as well
as worldwide. 8 The regulatory leverage that European competition
law is exerting on the companies that come under its jurisdiction,
including U.S. firms, is perplexing insofar as EU competition laws
were originally modeled on U.S. antitrust provisions in an attempt to
integrate international competition. 9
This Article introduces a framework for the evaluation of legal
transfers to new regulatory regimes that explains how the transfer of
U.S. antitrust to Europe led to the current situation, as well as the
general implications underlying the development of laws in forming
legal systems. The framework shows that transfers into forming legal
systems are more likely to be effective when the lack of established
institutions creates opportunities for stakeholders to assert

5.
See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.
2001); Commission Decision of Mar. 21, 2004, Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to
Article 82 of the EC Treaty, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/cases/decdocs/37792/37792_4177_1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KYP9KW8Q] (archived Oct. 5, 2015).
6.
See European Commission 15/4785, Press Release, Statement by
Commissioner Vestager on Antitrust Decisions Concerning Google (April 15, 2015)
[hereinafter Vestager Statement].
7.
Resolution on Supporting Consumer Rights in the Digital Single Market,
EUR. PARL. DOC. 2014/2973(RSP) (2014) [hereinafter Eur. Parl. Resolution]; see also
Alex Barker et al, Washington Weighs In on EU Google Probe, FINANCIAL TIMES
(November 25, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3d903290-74c9-11e4-a418-00144
feabdcO.html [http://perma.cc/P7RM-KM9M1] (archived Oct. 5, 2015); Press Release,
Federal Trade Commission, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission in the Matter
of Google Inc. (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc [https://perma.cc/WJC8DKW8] (archived Oct. 5, 2015).
8.
Cf. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 3, 32, 101-05, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU];
European Commission Press Release MEMO/08/132, Antitrust: Commission Welcomes
E.ON Proposals for Structural Remedies to Increase Competition in German Electricity
Market (Feb. 28, 2008).
9.
See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 19-22 (2012).
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themselves within -a new regulatory regime. No such opportunities
emerge if the institutional setting of an importing body is tightly
entrenched and has already determined the role the transplanted
measure would have. The discussion makes specific reference to the
transfer of U.S. antitrust to Japan, which occurred at the same time
and under similar circumstances as the transfer to the EC, but where
existing bureaucracies refused to integrate the law.10 The focus of the
existing literature on the role of institutions in integrating new laws
fails to explain transfers into nascent entities, where the introduction
of a law occurs just as the institutional and normative settings of the
receiving system are forming." As institutional constraints diminish,
the bargaining power of stakeholders becomes predictive of the
effectiveness of the transfer-the two parameters are inversely
proportional.
By applying public choice theory to the context of the formation
of laws, the analytical core of the framework explores the role of
stakeholders when the transfers into new regulatory regimes occur.
At present, public choice explanations in this context are limited to
stating that transferred laws are likely to reflect the normative
preferences of local advocates, but such an argument has never been
fully explored. 12 This Article claims that interest group theory is
fundamental to understanding and evaluating the development of
laws in new legal orders, and that it carries significant implications
for regional integration and regulatory globalization in general. 13 The

See ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 357-89 (1970); ETSUKO
10.
KAMEOKA, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND THE EU 5-6 (2014); see also

Iwakazu Takahashi, The Development of Competition Law for the Last 15 Years in
Japan: Progress or Setback?, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAWS: GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 87-107 (Roger Zach et al. eds., 2010).
11.
See discussion infra Section I.A. See generally DAVID NELKEN & JOHANNES
FEEST, ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES (2001); Berkowitz et al., supra note 4; Michele
Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE

LAW 441

(Mathias Reimann

&

Reinhard

&

Zimmermann eds., 2006)" Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic
Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative InstitutionalMeasures, 7 ECON.
POL. 207 (1995).
12.
See Karen Alter et al., Transplanting the European Court of Justice: The
Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 629, 635 (2012); Enrico
Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of InternationalEconomic
Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 925, 928-32
(1996); Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 4, at 353; Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics,
and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982)
("[Liegislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that
legislative protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it . . .");
Cf. Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and JudicialIntervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563,
566-67 (1983).
See TIM BOTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE
13.
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 18-40 (2011) (discussing the

creation of regulatory regimes in a vacuum and the issue of control); Robert D. Putnam,
Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, in DOUBLE-EDGED
DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 431, 431-68 (Peter
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metric that determines the effective development of a law in a
newborn system is connected to the bargaining power of stakeholders
that can benefit from the introduction of a new law-elements such
as confidence in the law's attainments, familiarity with its theoretical
basis, articulated strategies to implement it, and alignment with the
exporter's interpretative preferences (especially if there is outside
pressure to introduce the law) will increase the bargaining power of a
given stakeholder vis-A-vis its opposition. 14 The payoffs are
significant. The winning stakeholder will play a direct role in shaping
the policies used to apply the new law and capture positions within
the regulatory agency in charge of its administration. 15 This will help
the group secure stable outcomes, durable benefits, and long-lasting
power.
The argument is supported by a case study that shows that a
self-interested stakeholder used the introduction of U.S. antitrust
laws to its favor during the formation of the EC. The analysis directly
engages with the intellectual disciplines governing competition policy
in the United States and in Europe at the time of transfer and
uncovers the importance of a German liberal movement that emerged
as the winning stakeholder because it could define the transplanted
provisions in a way that would benefit its own constituency as well as
the United States. The United States had a keen interest that the
laws in Europe be used to break up concentrations and prohibit
anticompetitive behavior, and the approach to competition of the
German Ordoliberal movement could accommodate these goals. 16
This is the first analysis that compares and connects the approach to
antitrust of the Harvard School, also known as Structuralism, with
the discipline of the Ordoliberal School. It shows that the vision of the
Ordoliberals was not just the key to integrate the U.S. approach to
antitrust in Europe, but also to explain how competition policies are
applied by the European Commission today."
Finally, the dominance of the U.S. approach to antitrust ties the
present case study to the literature on state power and
B. Evans et al. eds., 1993). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); Eric A. POSNER & ALAN 0.
SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013).

14.

See discussion infra Section I.B.

15.
See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 9-21 (3d
ed. 1951); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 41-50 (1962); OLSON, supra

note 13, at 53.
16.
See discussion infra Section II.C.
17.

See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY

EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998) (acknowledging the importance of the
Ordoliberal School on the formation of European competition policy, but not connecting
it to the U.S. experience); DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC
DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST: AN EXAMINATION OF US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 18-21

(2015); Nicola Giocoli, Competition Versus Property Rights: American Antitrust Law,
the FreiburgSchool, and the Early Years of European Competition Policy, 5 J. COMP. L.
& ECON. 747, 767-80 (2009).

1152

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 48:1147

"Americanization" to the extent that the influence of hegemonic U.S.
ideas provoked a shift in the European system.' 8 This Article argues
that the transplant of antitrust into the ECSC was accepted because
it created an opportunity for certain constituencies that were
sophisticated and organized enough to use it to their advantage. This
interpretation differs from the conventional narrative that defends
the transplant as an assertion of American power. 19 Once the
Ordoliberal School had affirmed itself as a major influence on the
development of European competition law, the importance of the
American antitrust model diminished-and when the approach to
antitrust in the United States changed from rigorous enforcement to
the more laissez-faire attitude endorsed by the Chicago School, this
change was not reflected in Europe, where rigorous enforcement
remained the norm. 20 These diverging paths have led to a reversal of
the conventional story: in recent case law, European antitrust
regulations have come to define the standards under which large
corporations operate, causing great concern for U.S. companies. The
divergent opinions of the FTC and the European Commission on
Google's case merely illustrate this trend.
This work has broader implications for the globalization of
competition policy. The present discussion draws attention to the
antagonism between current approaches to antitrust in the United
States and the European Union, two major players in the global
economy. The approach other key participants decide to adopt will
have fundamental consequences for the evolution of transnational
competition law and the operation of international corporations. By
highlighting the role of stakeholders when the formation of

18.
See JEFF FRIEDEN, FROM ECONOMIC NATIONALISM TO HEGEMONY: SOCIAL
FoRCES AND THE EMERGENCY OF MODERN U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 1914-1940

(1986); R. Daniel Keleman & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japanese Law, 23
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 269, 269-74 (2002); Jacques de Lisle, Lex Americana?: United
States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the PostCommunist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179, 182-84 (1999); Ugo
Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance,
10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383, 384-86 (2003); Loukas A. Mistelis, Regulatory
Aspects: Globalization, Harmonization, Legal Transplants, and Law Reform-Some
Fundamental Observations, 34 INT'L L. 1055, 1059-60 (2000); Keith B. Norman, Our
Greatest Export: The Rule of Law, ALA. LAWYER (May 1999); Barry Posen, Command of
the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony, 28 INT'L SECURITY 5, 8-10
(2003); Elizabeth A. Summers, Recent Secured Transactions Law Reform in the Newly
Independent States and Central and Eastern Europe, 23 REV. CENT. EUR. L. 177, 18083 (1997); Elizabeth A. Summers, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in
Western Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 205-17 (1994); Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception
of American Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 246-48 (1991).
See Giocoli, supranote 17, at 748-50.
19.
20.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2001); Ronald H. Coase,
Industrial Organization:A Proposalfor Research, in 3 POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 69 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972); Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1984); see also
discussion infra Section II.C.
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regulatory regimes is at stake, this study provides guidance for
regional entities in Latin America, Africa and the Caribbean that are
currently in the process of developing supranational competition
policies to integrate their markets. 21 Lessons on stakeholders'
bargaining power may also have significant relevance for China,
whose new antitrust laws have been influenced by the United States
and Europe, but also specifically followed German patterns. 2 2 If
China and other key players in today's global economy follow the
European Commission's aggressive lead in pursuing antitrust abuses,
as evidence suggests that they are, global companies will be inhibited
from operating globally.23
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses transfers into
new regulatory regimes and shows how the present scholarship has
failed at explaining when such transfers are effective. In order to
bridge this gap, it develops a framework that relies on the presence of
a stakeholder within the importing entity that endorses the
transplant because it can benefit from it. Part III applies the
framework to the transfer of the U.S. antitrust provisions to Europe.
This section includes the comparative analysis of Structuralism and
Ordoliberalism. Part IV ties the influence of the Ordoliberal tradition
to modern-day antitrust developments.

II. CAPTURING LEGAL TRANSPLANTS

A. Transplants into New Regulatory Regimes
Transfers into new regulatory regimes present a little-explored
scenario. The scholarly literature on the movement of legal rules has
almost exclusively focused on the transfer of norms from one
jurisdiction to another. 24 This Part explains how a transplant into a

21.

See generally UNITED NATIONS, COMPETITION PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL

TRADE AGREEMENTS: How To ASSURE DEVELOPMENT GAINS (Philippe Brusick et al.,
2005) [hereinafter Brusick et al.].
22.

DAVID

J.

GERBER,

GLOBAL

COMPETITION:

LAW,

MARKETS,

AND

GLOBALIZATION 228-33 (2010).
23.
Michael Han & David Boyle, Antitrust Enforcement: China Ups the Ante,
COMPETITION POLY INT'L, Dec. 2014, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/
antitrust-enforcement-china-ups-the-ante [https://perma.cc/TH94-A5UR] (archived Oct.
5, 2014); see also Aaron Mamiit, $1 Billion: Fines Qualcomm Might Pay to Settle China
Antitrust Probe, TECH TIMES (Dec. 26, 2015, 9:44 AM), https://www.competitionpolicy
international.com/assetsfUploads/AsiaDecemberl4.pdf
[http://perma.cc/B6F6-XCM2]
(archived Oct. 5, 2015).
24.
See generally NELKEN & FEEST, supra note 11; Graziadei, supra note 11;
Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History
and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839
(2003). Examples of case studies are contained in edited collections, e.g.,
TRANSFRONTIER MOBILITY OF LAW (R. Jagtenberg et al. eds., 1995); COMPARING LEGAL
CULTURES (David Nelken, 1995); COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Andrew
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new legal order differs from other transplants, and it also shows that
existing models that inspect what determinants make a transfer
effective cannot account for transplants into forming systems.
The broad debate in the literature on legal transfers focuses on
whether and when laws can be successfully transferred from one
system to another. 25 Some scholars-notably Alan Watson-are
convinced that transplantations prove the autonomy of law, while
others argue that the law is embedded in society, and that transfers
can only survive if they can fit the social and economic conditions of
the society into which they are being transplanted. 26 Since the debate
was introduced, transfers have been examined from a variety of
perspectives, ranging from the causes of legal changes, to the
identification of elements that make a transplant effective. 27 The
present discussion focuses on this latter point and relies on a study by
Katharina Pistor (and others) that argues that the key to a successful
transfer is localization. 28 She claims that in order to succeed, a legal
Harding & E. Oruci eds., 2002); THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit
Choudhry ed., 2006); and journal special issues, e.g. Histories of Legal
Transplantations,10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 299 (2009).
25.

See generally ALAN WATSON,

LEGAL TRANSPLANTS:

AN APPROACH To

&

COMPARATIVE LAw 107 (2nd ed. 1993) ("The picture that emerge[s] [ius of continual
massive borrowing. . . of rules."); Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of
Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974) (arguing that the viability of a transplant
is related to the social and political environment of both the donor and receiving state);
Pierre LeGrand, The Impossibility of 'Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR.
COMP. L. 111, 118 (1997) (arguing that legal transplants are never possible because
during the process of transplantation every reform becomes localized: the product of
moving a rule elsewhere is always something else, "not the same rule").
26.

See WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, supra note 25, at 91-109.

27.
See Eric Agostini, La Circulation des Modeles Juridiques, 42 Revue
Internationale de Droit Compard [R.I.D.C.] 461 (1990) (distinguishing between
importers and exporters and between assimilation and adaptation in the latter
category); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law
(Installment 1), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 34 (1991) [hereinafter Sacco, Installment 1]
(developing a theory of legal change based on "legal formants," which shifts away from
the static approach of outlining the differences between legal families and instead
examines changes within the major legal systems as a process of constant evolution).
In any case, "history provides no evidence that uniformity is achieved through
comparative legal study. In the Middle Ages, Roman law spread throughout
Continental Europe because the other systems of rules with which it had to compete
lacked its quality and prestige. The jurists who turned to Roman law instead of to local
rules did not do so because they had compared the two. In most cases, the Roman rules
were the only ones they really knew, and their choice was more the result of ignorance
than of comparative study." Sacco, Installment , supra at 2; Graziadei, supra note 11,
at 443 (claiming that theories that propose unified theories fail to provide accurate
descriptions of the complexity and multidimensionality of the world of legal
transplants). In Germany, see the work of Reinhard Zimmermann, Reiner Schulze and
Elmar Wadle. In the United States see Edward Wise, James Gordley. In Italy, besides
Rodolfo Sacco, see Gino Gorla. In Great Britain see A. W. Brian Simpson and Basil
Markesinis.
See Berkowitz et al., supra note 4, at 167-69 (developing an empirical
28
exercise showing that the way in which a law is transplanted is a more important
determinant of effective transfer than the belonging to a compatible legal family).
Compare id. with La Porta & Al., Legal determinants of external finance, 52 J. OF
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transfer must be acceptable to the regulatory culture in which it is
inserted, and it must be made suitable for use so that it can be
developed by existing or newly formed institutions in a way that is
responsive to the local demand for that law. 29
The central claim in Pistoirs model states that ultimately it is
upon the institutional system in the receiving state to integrate the
new law. 30 Institutional receptiveness is measured by inspecting two
factors: (1) the familiarity of the importer with the legal system of the
exporter (i.e., legal tradition, common history, the legal concepts
being introduced), and (2) the importer's voluntary adaptation of the
foreign law to the local conditions during the importation process (i.e.,
this happens when there is demand for the law). 31 Both concepts are
closely connected to the institutional setup of the receiving country:
familiarity refers to the compatibility of the regulatory cultures
present in both countries, and the voluntary adaptation is a response
to the internal demand for legal innovation in a certain area of law. 32
If there is an institutional setting in the receiving country, assessing
familiarity and voluntary adaptation revolves around testing the
regulatory culture of such institutions or predicting the development
of new institutions based on the shape of the existing ones. This
assessment will suggest whether the importing body can
accommodate the transplanted law.
Often transplants fail because it is difficult to uproot established
institutions. The transfer of U.S. antitrust law to Japan, which
provides a valuable example because it occurred at approximately the
same time and under similar circumstances as the transfer to the
ECSC, is illustrative of the force of such institutional barriers in
preventing an effective transplant. 33 Before the transfer, in Japan,
FINANCE 1131-50 (1997) (arguing that legal families are important determinants of
financial market development).
29.
Berkowitz et al., supranote 4, at 167 ("[Flor the law to be effective, it must
be meaningful in the context in which it is applied so citizens have an incentive to use
the law and to demand institutions that work to enforce and develop the law.").
30.
See id. at 167-68.
31.
See id. at 182.
32.
See id. at 177 ("But even for professionals to apply a special rule, they
must not only grasp the wording of that rule, but also the concept behind it, the value
judgments on which it rests, and its position within the overall legal order. Even a
seemingly clear law-do not steal!-raises a host of interpretative problems when
applied to real world cases ... An identical rule like this one, will be interpreted
differently by those charged with applying it and will be influenced by their
understanding of the underlying values on which this norm rests."); see also Hideki
Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director's
Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 897-901 (2003);
Curtis J. Milahaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in
Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2220 (2005).
33.
See HADLEY, supra note 10, at 357-89; Takahashi, supra note 10, at 87-96;
Harry First, Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 137, 173-82 (1995)
[hereinafter First, Antitrust Enforcement]; Harry First, Antitrust in Japan: The
Original Intent, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 21-22 (2000) [hereinafter First, Original
Intent].
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antitrust was one of many instruments used by bureaucrats to guide
and foster the national economy, at times through the active
promotion of cartels. 34 The role that the Japanese government had
assigned to antitrust policies stood in opposition to the focus of U.S.
antitrust law on the advancement of competition and individual
freedom. Such tensions affected the negotiations over the content of
the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, when it was adopted in 1947 under
the pressure of the U.S. occupation.35 Even though the substantive
legal provisions of the Act were very similar to the Sherman Act, and
an independent enforcement agency similar to the FTC was
introduced to apply them, the U.S. provisions were not developed into
effective law.3 6 The Japanese regulatory culture was not used to
having independent agencies that were not subject to established
37
economic policies and the direct control of an existing ministry.
The institutional structure of existing bureaucracies ultimately
constrained the integration of the U.S. antitrust model in Japan. The
agency created by the Americans was unable to assert its power
within an existing bureaucracy that was accustomed to controlling
every angle of the economy. The other ministries, especially the MITI
(Ministry of Internal Trade and Industry), did not let the agency
operate freely by reserving the power to be involved in matters of
industrial policy, and by exerting pressure to keep the level of
antitrust enforcement low.38 Its functionality was also limited by the

34.

See CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH

OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 1925-1975 108-09 (1982) (explaining that an official of the
MITI spent seven months in Berlin reporting on industrial rationalization,
emphasizing the usefulness of government-sponsored cartels); Shuya Hayashi, The
Goal of Japanese Competition Law, in ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW 57
(2009) (stating that, before the transfer, Japan had no experience with competition
law); Mitsuo Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Law in Japan, in GLOBAL COMPETITION
POLICY 151, 181 (1997) (explaining that before the transfer the Japanese economy was
protective of the so-called "zaibatsu" conglomerates and arguing that the Japanese
developed competition policies to appease the Allied occupation forces); Takahashi,
supra note 10, at 93-96; First, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 33, at 144; J. Mark
Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional
Barriersto Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 643-45 (1985).
See Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair
35.
Trade, Act No. 54 of 1947 (Japan), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation-gls/
amended-ama09/index.files/TheAntimonopoly-Act.pdf [http://perma.cclV25Q-5EQW]
(archived Oct. 5, 2015); KAMEOKA, supra note 10, at 10-20 (arguing that industrial
policies prioritizing the needs of the national economy overshadowed the vision of
competitive markets that the United States had in mind); First, Antitrust Enforcement,
supra note 33, at 144; Takahashi, supra note 10, at 93-96.
See Takahashi, supra note 10, at 87-88; First, Antitrust Enforcement,
36.
supra note 33, at 173-82.
See Takahashi, supra note 10, at 94-95.
37.
See KAMEOKA, supra note 10, at 28-30 (arguing that Japanese focus on
38.
industrial policy as administered by the MITI, which included the regulatory control of
industrial conglomerates, preempted the application and enforcement of competition
rules); First, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 33, at 154-157.
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allocation of meager funds for its operations. 39 The few cases brought
to the agency were disposed of bureaucratically, almost exclusively
through private settlements, and only rarely litigated in courts. 40
This strategy to keep the courts uninvolved and to restrain the
doctrinal development of the Act was purposeful: it left the
bureaucracy with the power to control antitrust decisions by not
having to abide to preexisting legal requirements. 4 ' The result was a
system of weak enforcement where the laws remained ambiguous and
executive bodies maintained full discretion over what concerned the
administrative guidance of antitrust.42 In short, Japan accepted the
law into its system, but used its institutions to limit its usefulness.
The above discussion suggests that the effectiveness of a legal
transplant has less to do with the substantive provisions than with
the internal logic of existing institutions. The antitrust transplant
from the United States to Japan was largely ineffective because there
was no familiarity with the American regulatory culture, and at the
time of the transfer, the Japanese made no effort to accommodate the
American legalistic tradition within its bureaucratic structure.
Familiarity and voluntary adaptation are useful concepts to think
about transplants, but they seem to be more easily applicable to a
situation that involves a transfer from one jurisdiction to another,
where both the exporting and the receiving country have an
institutionalized legal system in place. In a situation where the
importing body does not yet have established institutions, the
localization model becomes insufficient, and the evaluation of criteria
such as familiarity and voluntary adaptation loses importance
because, even if there is neither familiarity with the imported law nor
a sign of voluntary reception, a transplant can still be effective. When
inspecting a transplant in a new regulatory regime, the lack of an
institutional structure itself becomes the predictor of legal
development.
The localization model is not immediately applicable to the
transplant of U.S. antitrust to the EC because it cannot account for
the fact that at the time of the transplant the EC was a nascent

39.
First, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 33, at 155.
40.
See KAMEOKA, supra note 10, at 30-32 (explaining that competition law
enforcement through "administrative guidance" was insufficient at preventing or
stopping anticompetitive practices); First, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 33, at 154.
41.
See First, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 33, at 176-77 ("[I]n the area
of joint conduct it is not clear what, beyond the most overt behavior, constitutes an
"agreement," nor is it clear under what circumstances competitor agreements on price
might be justified.").
42.
See KAMEOKA, supra note 10, at 14 (arguing that the Antimonopoly Act
was weakened by a 1953 amendment); see also Takako Ishihara, IndustrialPolicy and
Competition Policy, JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM'N, http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpfl05/
jicatext/aug27.pdf [http://perma.ce/5252-8K9Z] (archived Oct. 5, 2015) (arguing that the
1953 amendment and the purposively weak implementation of competition law in
Japan reflected its inability to find a place in the national social and economic context).
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entity without an institutionalized setup. The dynamics of the EC
transplant will be examined in detail below, but for present purposes
may it suffice to say that the main way in which the European
antitrust transplant case differed from the Japanese one, was that it
involved a transplant to a supranational entity, at the point in time
when its laws and institutions had yet to be decided upon. In the
Japan case, the U.S. antitrust laws were transferred into an
established context accustomed to a different set of rules, in the EC
the same rules were transplanted into a not-yet-formed context that
was in the course of framing its rules and institutions. There was no
preexisting institutional system to adapt the foreign law to. Instead,
the U.S. provisions were to regulate the internal market of a newly
born supranational community of states that was in the process of
being formed.
Testing for familiarity and voluntary adaptation in the EC
transfer case would have predicted a negative outcome. There was no
familiarity with the U.S. system, nor with antitrust and its
attainments in general, as only very few countries in Europe had
antitrust laws in place, and they were largely ineffective and scarcely
enforced. 43 There was also a lack of voluntary adaptation, as the
occupation forces initially forced the provisions into the ECSC
treaty. 44 The relevant debate in the social sciences, which inspects
the processes and mechanisms through which policies, institutions,
and norms spread around the world-also known as "diffusion"would categorize this as a coerced transfer and would also predict a
negative outcome. 45 There was however on the European end, a
strong demand to lay the foundations of a new economic order-and
such demand integrated the laws as part of a reform process
46
instigated by a native stakeholder.

GERBER, supranote 17, at 166-67.
43.
See Graziadei, supra note 11, at 456-57; Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants:A
44.
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 359
(1991) [hereinafter Sacco, Installment 11]. On coercion in this context, see Julie Mertus,
Book Review, 21 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 581, 582 (1999) (reviewing THOMAS DAVID JONES,
HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUP DEFAMATION, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE LAW OF

NATIONS (1998)), who argues that superpower hegemony imposes legal rules on less
powerful nations, because the superpower cannot be denied: "the legal transplant
process is generally marked by some form of coercion, ... states that adapt their laws
to conform with the laws of politically powerful states are rewarded ... while those
that do not are penalized." See also Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Appraisingthe Methods of InternationalLaw: A Prospectusfor Readers, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 291, 291-301 (1999).
45.
See Dobbin et al., supra note 4, at 449; Zachary Elkins & Beth Simmons,
On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 33 (2005) (elaborating on a theoretical and conceptual framework that
distinguishes between adaptation and learning).
See Wolfgang Wiegand, Americanization of Law: Reception or
46.
Convergence?, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

137,

138 (1996);

Wiegand, supra note 18, at 230-31. See generally CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS:
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B. The Role of Stakeholders
A transplant into a new regulatory regime calls for the
examination of new elements that can account for its effectiveness.
This section develops a framework that explains legal transplants
using interest group theory. The framework is premised on the
argument that if a legal transplant is made effective by inducing an
internal process of legislating, there must be a group of stakeholders
in the receiving entity that supports the reception of the transplanted
law, because such group will gain benefits through its use and
application.
The transfer of a law into a new context sets into motion
different dynamics depending on whether the law is transferred to an
existing order or to a new order. If the introduction of a law occurs at
the moment in time when the institutional and normative settings of
the receiving body are forming, several groups will compete over how
to implement the given law, because this will enable them to
influence the formation of the institutional structure of the new
system and gain power. This is not expected to happen when the
institutional setting of an importing body is tightly entrenched
because such rooted setup will emerge as the strongest stakeholder
and dictate the role the transplanted measure will have. That is what
happened with the antitrust transplant to Japan, where the
government-the leading and unrivaled stakeholder-rendered the
new law ineffective by isolating it in a system that could not
assimilate it. 47 In a situation where institutions are in the process of
being conceived, there is space for competing meanings of a given
legal measure, and such different meanings will benefit different
groups. Groups with high stakes in the outcome of the policy are
expected to spend substantial effort fighting for the implementation
of a new law, so that their preferred policy outcomes are
implemented, and so they can assert themselves within the new
regulatory framework created for the law's administration. 48 This will
help the group secure stable outcomes, durable benefits, and longlasting power.
Supranational capture in this sense differs from regulatory
capture in traditional public choice analysis. Public choice theory
assumes that local politicians and bureaucrats are rationally selfTHE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD (Louis Henkin & Albert

J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); Joan Davison, America's Impact on Constitutional Change in
Eastern Europe, 55 ALB. L. REV. 793 (1992); Miller, supra note 24, at 847 (arguing that
externally-dictated transplants are implemented to satisfy the demands of foreign
states or entities in order to obtain benefits or avoid penalties for the nation or national
interest).
47.
See First, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 33, at 178 ("In Japan,
legalistic antitrust was placed in the context of a bureaucratic regulatory culture.").
48.

See MARVER

COMMISSION 74-95 (1955).

H.

BERNSTEIN, REGULATING

BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
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interested individuals who will attempt to influence policy to
maximize their personal power. 49 The dynamics of regulatory capture
within existing jurisdictions have been studied and explained mostly
in connection with rent-seeking and other benefits that can be
obtained by influencing regulation, but not in connection with the
development of rules in the absence of established institutions.5 0 The
presence of established institutions does not inhibit stakeholders or
interest groups from lobbying for the introduction of rules that would
advance their interest, but it does limit their scope. Such rules would
only be recognized to the extent that they can further the general
economic policies advocated by the establishment. The rivalry would
take place among constituencies that endorse laws that further
previously chosen policy goals. If the constituencies' preferences do
not further those goals, legal change would be limited to isolated
innovations disconnected from key policymaking areas.
This type of supranational capture also differs from capture in
the context of harmonization, and the creation of international law or
global rules, which has been studied in many settings and describes
multiparty negotiations that take into account the complex power
structure of each country's government and the interests of other
constituencies. 51 The difference lies in the way of legislating. Most of
these negotiations do primarily concern standards, as opposed to
laws, and the power to administer such standards is usually

49.
See generally MAXWELL STEARNS & TODD ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE
CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009).
50.
See, e.g., George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3-21 (1971); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of
Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089,
1089-127 (1991); Micheal Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public
Interest and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 185
(1990).
51.
See BOTE & MATrLI, supra note 13, at 18-40; Putnam, supra note 13, at
431-68; Colombatto & Macey, supra note 12, at 955. On regime theory, see generally
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1983); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).

On harmonization, see Li Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting:
Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L.
711, 712 (2009) (explaining that harmonization is seen as an approximation of national
laws by virtue of legal and administrative action taken by international governmental
or non-governmental organizations and that there are hard and soft approaches to
harmonization). Examples of the hard approach are the legal interactions between the
WTO and its members, or between the European Union and its Member States,
whereas examples of the soft approach include the OECD Corporate Governance
Principles and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. See
Lin, supra, at 712; see also Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal
Transplants in Russia and EasternEurope, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 115-17 (1995); Louis
F. Del Duca, Developing Global Transnational Harmonization Procedures for the
Twenty-First Century: The Accelerating Pace of Common and Civil Law Convergence,
42 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 625, 626 (2007); Wei Shi, Globalization and Indigenization: Legal
Transplant of a Universal TRIPS Regime in a Multicultural World, 47 AM. Bus. L.J.
455, 455 (2010).
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delegated to supranational institutions that have limited enforcement
powers.5 2 Effective supranational organizations are rare, as states are
typically reluctant to devolve their legislating power to supranational
institutions, and resort to charging standard-setting bodies with the
task to regulate through soft measures.5 3 This study is different. It
inspects the horizontal introduction of a foreign law into a
supranational entity at its inception, and not a vertical standard it
had to comply with. In the present case, the stakeholder was
successful because it had expertise in a field that was introduced as a
full legal measure, and the system in charge of enforcing it agreed to
comply with the respective commitments.
The next step involves teasing out what factors make a
stakeholder successful in its pursuit to influence a newly
transplanted law. Public choice theory maintains that successful
interest groups are coherent, well organized, and that they have
4
charismatic leaders and articulate strategies and plans.5 It also
suggests that the likelihood of their success is a function of how
(poorly) organized the opposition is.55 If the opposition is diffused and
not motivated to educate itself on the matter at issue, a stakeholder
56
with an elaborate plan is likely emerge as the winner. The amount
of effort dedicated by a given group to lobby for a specific
interpretation of a law is anticipated to be proportional to the profits
57
that can be obtained through its applicability. In a situation where
institutions are being created and power is being allocated among
them, substantial extra returns can be gained by capturing positions
in agencies charged with the administration of that law because it

&

See BlTE & MArLI, supra note 13, at 18-40; JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC
52.
A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-100 (2005); ROBERT E. SCOTT
PAUL

B.

STEPHAN,

THE

LIMITS

OF

LEVIATHAN:

CONTRACT

THEORY

AND

THE

ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 112-20 (2006); Dinah Shelton, Introduction, in
COMMITMENT

AND

COMPLIANCE:

THE

ROLE

OF

NON-BINDING

NORMS

IN

THE

&

&

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1, 1-18 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Kenneth Abbott
Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L. ORG. 421,
422 (2000) (stating that soft measures reflect commitments that are less strong than
legal commitments); Jacob Gersen & Eric Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from
Congressional Practice, 61 STANFORD L. REV. 573, 575 (2008); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 568, 579, 621 (1992); Charles
Lipson, Why Are Some InternationalAgreements Informal?, 45 INT'L. ORG. 495, 500-02
(1991) (arguing that soft laws are useful because they are flexible and can be
negotiated quickly, in a way that legal agreements are not).
Gersen & Posner, supra note 52, at 575. For specific examples, see BOTE
53.
MATTLI, supra note 13, at 18-40.
OLSON, supranote 13, at 63-75.
54.
55.

See

MICHAEL

HAYES,

LOBBYISTS AND

LEGISLATORS:

A THEORY

OF

POLITICAL MARKETS 59 (1981); OLSON, supra note 13, at 63-75; STEARNS & ZYWICKI,
supra note 49, at 69-72; JAMES WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 332-37 (1973).
OLSON, supra note 13, at 63-75; STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 49, at
56.
376-78.
OLSON, supra note 13, at 63-75.
57.
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will enable the group to "feed itself' and stay powerful. 5s
Furthermore, a transplant in a new regulatory body is likely to be
captured when an unconstrained constituency within the importing
entity is educated and informed enough to interpret a certain
transplanted law in a way that endorses, to some extent, the
intellectual approach used to apply the same rule in the exporting
entity.
The latter argument focuses on the intellectual alignment of the
parties to the transfer in what concerns the meaning of a legal rule.59
If the exporter maintains some power over the importer, in view of
the allocation of such powerful. positions, the importer's
constituencies will seek to influence a new law in a way that pleases
the exporting body. In turn, the exporter is most likely to cooperate
with constituencies that support an interpretation of the law that is
in line with its goals. In this sense, once a transfer has been
identified, an important consideration becomes the assessment of the
rational principles used to apply the law in the exporting country.60
This requires the examination of intellectual connections and political
mechanisms that the exporting institution utilizes to shape its
policies.6 1 If such intellectual determinants and mechanisms find a
counterpart in the receiving entity, then such counterpart will invest
resources and effort in order to capture the interpretation and
administration of the transferred law, because it will then be able to
utilize them to further its own goals and purposes. Agreement on the
way a legal rule is to be understood and interpreted presents
advantages for both parties: the stakeholder benefits because it can
defeat its opposition and gain power, and the exporter for the reasons
it induced the transfer of law in the first place-which in the case of
antitrust usually involves obtaining market access.
At its core, the framework of the captured transplant aims at
identifying the unifying elements in the regimes of the exporter and
the importer at the time of the transplant in order to predict its

Id.
58.
59.
Id.; see also LeGrand, supra note 25, at 116; Wendy Wagner,
Administrative Law, FilterFailure, and Information Capture, 59 DuKE L.J. 1321, 1325
(2010).
60.
See LeGrand, supra note 25, at 114 (arguing that rules and meaning are
separate concepts, that "[t]he meaning of a rule, however, is not entirely supplied by
the rule itself," and that "meaning is also-and perhaps mostly-a function of the
application of the rule by its interpreter, of the concretization or instantiation in the
events the rule is meant to govern").
61.
See WATSON, supra note 25; Kahn-Freud, supra note 25, at 27; Sacco,
Installment I, supra note 27, at 21 ("If, then, we are to compare the rules of the Italian
legal system with those of the English system, which rule are we to compare? The
constitutional rule, the statutory rule or the judicial rule?").
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significance. 62 The more articulated the instruments used, the easier
it is to compare them and make this prediction. The preferences of
interpretative communities in exporting countries are usually more
easily discerned than the ones in the receiving entity, especially if the
receiving entity is in the process of being formed and several groups
with differing preferences are negotiating. 63 In the latter case, the
way of thinking about the law will come from the elements that form
the individual legal orders of many negotiating member states, and
reflect their bargaining power. Each of the bargaining states will be
conditioned by a series of factors, and by a framework of intangible
values within which its interpretivecommunities operate, and which
have normative force for these communities but not necessarily for
the supranational entity. Ultimately, however, one legal tradition will
prevail, and if the social and intellectual contexts of this tradition can
lend themselves to the transposition of the intellectual preferences of
the exporting country, the transplanted law is likely to be endorsed. 64
The key issue then becomes inspecting what factors are relevant
proxies when measuring the compatibility of . the interpretative
context, because this is what will ultimately make the transfer
effective.
The case study of the transfer of U.S. antitrust law to the EC
finds evidence to support several of the propositions outlined above.
The aim of the Americans with the transfer of their antitrust law to
Europe was to enable American businesses to access the European
market, and, in order to do so, existing cartels had to be fragmented.
The Americans therefore had a keen interest that antitrust laws in
Europe would be used in the same way they were used in the United
States, where, more than at any point in time before, antitrust
measures were aggressively enforced to punish anticompetitive
practices and excessive market power; and this was in line with the
intellectual discipline of the Harvard School, the dominant school on
competition policy at the time. A positive outcome would have

See David Nelken, Comparatists and Transferability, in COMPARATIVE
62.
LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITION 437, 456-59 (Pierre LeGrand & Roderick
Munday eds., 2003).
See Sacco, Installment II, supra note 44, at 348 ("To defend their views, the
63.
scholars elaborate systematic criteria for the legal method around which 'schools' form
such as the current law and economics movement. The importance of scholarly activity
is perhaps the feature, which most distinguishes American from English law.").
See id. at 389 ("For example, one of the strongest anti-formalist
64.
methodological trends relates legal phenomena to economic reality. Most of the
representatives of this tendency analyze economic reality in terms of conflicting class
interests. We have nothing to say against this way of investigating. However, to reach
any sound conclusions one must be able to establish connections between class interest
and legal superstructure, legal rules and institutions. To do so one must show that
certain legal solutions actually accompany any instance of a given class structure, and
that a certain class structure actually correlates with the emergence of a given legal
solution. It is incredible that this methodological principle is hardly ever put into
practice.").
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ultimately depended on the ability of a stakeholder in the EC to give
a meaning to the transplanted provisions that would benefit its own
constituency as well as the United States.
The stakeholders in Europe included several groups of
representatives of the member states involved in the negotiation of
the nascent EC, and they all understood the need to lay the
foundations of a new integrated economic system, but their
knowledge of antitrust was mostly limited. 65 The case study that
follows explains that the German Ordoliberal School emerged as the
winning stakeholder that was successful in appropriating the
transplanted law because it had a deeper knowledge about antitrust
than its opposition, and its vision of a competitive system was
compatible with the American perspective. Furthermore, the moment
of formation of a new regulatory regime and the absence of
institutional constraints helped its members achieve significant
power and important positions within the new administration.

III. THE CASE STUDY: U.S. ANTITRUST IN EUROPE
This Part will unpack the facts in order to contextualize the
transfer. In light of these facts, which narrate the story of the
transfer of U.S. antitrust provisions to the entity that was going to
become the EC, the present discussion illustrates the approaches
underlying competition policy on both sides of the Atlantic in order to
show that the transplant was made effective by the presence of a
stakeholder that believed in concepts that were similar to those of the
American school.
In the 1950s, the United States was provided with the occasion
to directly influence the competition policies of the ECSC, an
institution with a cross-national dimension that was later going to
develop into the European Community. 66 The ECSC treaty
established a supranational infrastructure designed to regulate the
integration of European coal, steel, and related sectors, and it
presented the very start of a European history of supranational
competition policy. Six European countries founded the ECSC in
1951: Germany, France, Italy, and the three Benelux states. 67 The

See discussion infra Part II.C.
65.
66.
JEAN MONNET, MAMOIRS 349-360 (1976). The ECSC Treaty expired in July
2002 and the coal and steel sectors of the EC Member States became subject to the
market rules of the EC market.
See id. at 342-343 (using a pragmatic internationalist approach
67.
emphasizing the common interests of participating states); see also FRANQOIS
DUCHENE, JEAN MONNET: THE FIRST STATESMAN FOR INDEPENDENCE 209-23 (1994);
ROBERT SCHUMAN, ORIGINES ET ELABORATIONS DU 'PLAN SCHUMAN' 272 (1953) ("But
through these perspectives of an economic kind . .. we have in particular focused on

the advantages i'mmediately achieved in the political domain. To conclude a durable
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United States was able to directly influence the negotiations leading
to the framing of the competition policy provisions of the ECSC treaty
by
making
reconstruction
resources
conditional
on
the
deconcentration of major cartelized industries. 6 8
While Americans were accustomed to thinking in terms of
competition policy, Europeans did not have much direct experience
with competition law and its attainments. Only a few countries in
Europe had competition laws in place at that time, and they were
mostly of minor relevance. 69 The founders of the EC, however,
understood the thought behind competition policy well enough to see
it as a tool to further their ends, namely to facilitate the creation of
an integrated market. In an effort to leverage the allocation of
political powers within the new union and to overcome this lack of
expertise in the field of competition, Jeanne Monnet, the Planning
Commissioner of France after the liberation, assigned the task of
designing the antitrust provisions of the newborn treaty to a group of
antitrust experts from the American Delegation. 70 Robert Bowie, the
and controlled union regarding coal and steel would be to prevent each country
involved not only from waging but even from preparing for war against the other
countries involved.").
68.
See Marie Laure Djelic, Does Europe Mean Americanization? The Case of
Competition, 6 COMPETITION & CHANGE 223, 245 (2002) (quoting Walter Hallstein
saying to the German government on October 19, 1950, "Monnet's ideas are probably
also influenced by the American desire that all cartel-like institutions be rejected-a
desire that gains special weight due to the fact that it is supported by the funds that
Americans are to provide at a later stage."); see also WILLIAM DIEBOLD, THE SCHUMAN
PLAN: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION 1950-1959, at 49-78 (1959); MARIE LAURE
DJELIC, EXPORTING THE AMERICAN MODEL: THE POST WAR TRANSFORMATION OF
EUROPEAN BUSINESS 81 (1988); ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL,

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FORCES 1950-1957, at 242 (1958); WALTER HALLSTEIN, EUROPE
IN THE MAKING 110 (1972); MONNET, supra note 66, at 356; Heinrich Karl Bock & Hans
Korsch, Decartelizationand Deconcentration in the West German Economy Since 1945,
in ANTI-TRUST LAws: A COMPARATIVE SYMPOSIUM 138-75 (1956); Gerhard Bebr, Labor
and the Schuman Plan, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1022 (1954). Note that Spain did not
receive any aid under the Marshall plan. See J. Bradford De Long & Barry J.
Eichengreen, The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment
Program14 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3899, 1991).
See GERBER, supra note 17, at 43-114, 171 (explaining that, although the
69.
general thinking about competition law in Europe started in the 1890s in Vienna, it
never translated into applicable provisions until 1923, when the first European
competition law was enacted in Germany, where it was, however, eliminated in the
30s, and that Norway and Sweden enacted competition laws in 1925 and 1926
respectively but such laws were of minor relevance, and that most competition
legislation was enacted after the World War II).
70.
See MONNET, supra note 66; see also GERBER, supra note 17, at 338
(explaining the role of George Ball, a U.S. lawyer based in Paris who was asked to
comment on the drafts, and reporting that "George Ball notes how during the
negotiations he left through the backdoor of the building where Monnet was
masterminding the drafting and negotiating of the treaty-in case Europeans
arrived"); GEORGE W. BALL, MEMOIRS 88-89 (1st ed. 1982); Yannis Karagiannis, The
Causes and Consequences of the Collegial Implementation of European Competition
Law, 19 EUR. L.J. 682, 700-704 (2013) (analyzing the countervailing French and
German interests when negotiating with the American counterpart); Yannis
Karagiannis, The Origins of European Competition Policy: Redistributive Versus
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legal counsel of the U.S. High Commission to Germany, drafted
Articles 65 and 66 of the treaty, the main competition law provisions
of the nascent community.7 1 When Bowie wrote the drafts he drew
heavily on the American experience and, not surprisingly, the articles
72
resembled Sections I and II of the Sherman Act quite closely.
Bowie's knowledge and background in antitrust heavily
influenced his drafting and are therefore instrumental to the
understanding of the new competition law provisions. Before coming
to Europe, Bowie had been a professor at Harvard Law School
specializing in antitrust. 73 At Harvard, he supported notions of
antitrust that strongly condemned excessive market power and
anticompetitive practices, such as the excess profits resulting from
monopolistic behavior. 74 The idea that deconcentrated markets are
more efficient than concentrated ones had been rooted in his mindset
since his days as a student. As a result, Bowie thought that the right
role of the American establishment in Europe was to introduce
policies based on democratic capitalism, liberal political values and
free trade, which had proved enormously successful in the United
States. However, in order to do this, aggregations of power had to be
broken up first.75
The competition policy provisions set out in the ECSC Treaty, in
Monnet's words "Europe's first major antitrust law," resembled the
American prohibition-based approach very closely.
Article 65(1) prohibited anticompetitive agreements among
enterprises or associations of enterprises, and cartels in the form of
concerted practices that tended, directly or indirectly, to "prevent,
restrict or distort the normal operation of competition within the

Ideational Explanations, 20 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 777-94 (stressing the importance of the
French negotiating power in connection with the aims and functions of the new laws);
Raymond Vernon, The Schuman Plan, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 183, 183-97 (1953) ("The
reasons for [competition law] provisions are to be found only partly in the drafters'
adherence to competition as an economic way of life. More important, perhaps, was the
concern of the drafters that cartels, if permitted to develop, might become the real
political power of the Community and might constitute a challenge to the Community's
sovereignty.").
MONNET, supra note 66; ROBERT R. BOWIE, RtFLEXIONS SUR JEAN MONNET
71.
IN TtMOIGNAGES A LA MkMOIRE DE JEAN MONNET 81 (1989).

See generally TFEU, supra note 8; Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the
72.
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and
Certain Related Acts, arts. 80, 81, 1997 O.J. (C 340); Treaty of Rome, art. 85-86, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
Julia D. Maxwell, Robert Bowie, Founder of Harvard's Weatherhead
73.
2013),
3,
(December
CRIMSON
HARVARD
104,
at
Dies
Center,
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/12/3/robert-bowie-dies-at-104/
[http://perma.cc/T56Y-U433] (archived Oct. 14, 2015).
See Carl Kaysen, Collusion Under the Sherman Act, 65 Q.J. EcON. 263, 263
74.
(1951) (acknowledging the helpful comments of Professor Bowie).
Robert Bowie, Section Seven of the Clayton Act (1934) (unpublished third
75.
year paper) (on file with the Harvard University Library System). As a 3L, Bowie wrote
this paper on merger policies.
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common market."76 Some examples given are actions tending to fix
prices, the restriction or control of production, technical development
and investments, and the allocation of consumers, markets, products
or sources of supply.7 7 This provision was widely drafted: it not only
encompassed cartels, which are agreements between separate
companies in the same line of business that are designed to limit or
eliminate competition, but also included a wider spectrum of
horizontal as well as vertical agreements between two or more
enterprises operating at different levels of the same productiondistribution-consumption process.7 8
Article 65(2) authorized the enforcement body, the High
Authority, to permit certain types of agreements prohibited by
subsection (1) if specific exceptional circumstances were met.79 For
instance, agreements that furthered product specialization and
agreements for joint buying and selling of such products were
exempted from the application of subsection (1), provided that they
would substantially improve the production and distribution of the
products in question and that the agreement was the only way to
achieve the same result. 80 Improved market performance was
paramount, as long as the agreements were not capable of giving the
interested firms power to fix prices, to control output, to stifle
competition, or simply to abuse their dominant position.
The other competition law article of the treaty, Article 66,
contained detailed provisions dealing with concentrations, which
could be effected by "merger, acquisition of shares or assets, loan,
contract, or any other means of control." 81 According to 66(1),
concentrations that had the potential to harm competition were
proscribed, whereas mergers that could be shown to result in
efficiencies and enhanced productivity could be authorized. 82 The
provision states that harm to competition would result when a
concentration gained enough power to influence prices, control
production, or gain an unfair advantage in accessing supplies or
markets.8 3 The executive power to enforce all the above provisions
was vested in the High Authority, a body composed of nine members,
eight of whom were appointed and the ninth elected by the
governments of member states. 84 In connection with Article 66(1), a
merger would require prior authorization by the High Authority,

76.
Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 65,
April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
Id.
80.
81.
Id. art. 66.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. arts. 8-19.
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whose powers in merger control proceedings were, at the time,
without precedent."
The new supranational competition law provisions were not only
drafted to resemble the competition law provisions of the Sherman
Act, but also reflected a prohibition approach to competition that was
in line with the Harvard School tradition, at least as far as restrictive
practices and cartels were concerned. These provisions were at first
only designed to apply to the coal and steel industry, but their scope
was widened to include other sectors when the same articles became
the relevant antitrust sections of the Treaty of Rome, which paved
the way for the creation of the EC.86 The Americans had succeeded in
transplanting their antitrust laws into Europe at a time when its
supranational institutional structure was being negotiated, and the
lack of existing power structures facilitated their introduction and
assimilation.
A. The Harvard School and Structuralism
The narrative above suggests that there was an almost direct
transplant of U.S. antitrust law to Europe and that it was
significantly facilitated by the fact that the ECSC was at its
inception. Yet the provisions themselves leave much unsaid, as they
could be interpreted in many ways. The present section examines the
approach of the Harvard School to antitrust policy. The section that
follows inspects whether the intellectual discipline that was steering
the way the provisions were implemented in the United States had a
counterpart in Europe, as this would have increased the chances of
making the transplant effective.
Since its enactment in 1890, the Sherman Act has been
interpreted in a multitude of ways, ranging from the application of
the rule of reason to the neglect of antitrust enforcement, from
imperfect competition to the strict condemnation of market power,
but for most of the twentieth century the U.S. antitrust tradition
treated most monopolies with distrust.8 7 In 1911 for instance, a

Id. art. 66.
85.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community Signed at Rome,
86.
March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. The Treaty did not include specific merger
provisions, they were introduced later through legislation and the case law. See
European Commission, Problem of Concentration of Enterprises in the Common
Market, Competition Series, Study No. 3 (1966); Joint Cases 142/84 & 156/84, British
Am. Tobacco Co. & RJ Reynolds v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487; Council Regulation
139/2004 of Jan. 20, 2004, On the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings
(the EC Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. (L 24); Council Regulation 4064/89 of Dec. 21,
1989, On the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395).
Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890); see also JOSEPH
87.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-106 (1942); Kenneth Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
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landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court broke petroleum giant
Standard Oil into thirty-four sub-entities after holding that it was
abusing its monopoly position.88 The fear of monopolies reached its
peak at the time of the transplant, a point in time when the American
antitrust tradition was characterized by Structuralism, an approach
to antitrust associated with the Harvard School, which endorsed the
aggressive pursuit of antitrust practices, and which was heavily
concerned about the structural manifestations of monopolistic
power.8 9 The power of big corporations was perceived as a threat to
democratic government policies, and antitrust laws were seen as the
tools to combat such a threat and enhance economic prosperity.9 0
This call for the vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws resulted
in a number of Supreme Court decisions that manipulated the
Sherman Act to introduce new per se prohibitions concerning
restraints of trade and monopolization matters.9 1 In Interstate Circuit
and Socony Vacuum Oil, conscious parallelism and price fixing

DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619 (1962);
Giocoli, supra note 17, at 758-63.
88.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 71-82 (1911).
89.
Id. at 9; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement,
78 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 74 (2012).
90.
See Frank A. Fetter, The Economist's Committee on Anti-Trust Law Policy,
22 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465-69 (1932) (stating that 127 economists signed a petition
attacking cartels and the undaunted economic power yielded by many big
corporations); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Letter to the Secretary of State Relating to
Elimination of Cartels, September 6, 1944, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: F.D. ROOSEVELT 1944-1945, Kilgore Committee, Mobilization
Hearings, Part 16, 2038 ("[C]artel practices which restrict the free flow of goods in
foreign commerce would have to be curbed."); see also RICHARD J. HOFSTADTER, THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 212-13 (1952) (explaining

that the acceptance of large corporations accustomed people to bureaucratic careers
and this getting accustomed to living in the corporate framework possibly explains a
decline in interest in antitrust's grandiose theories, it was becoming more and more a
topic for specialists and technocrats); Elmo Roper, The Public Looks at Business, 27
HARV. BUS. REV. 165, 165-174 (1949) (explaining that this sharp revival of antitrust
enforcement activities took place at a time when the public had come to view big
corporations in predominantly favorable terms, one reason for this being that the
economy had performed well since the beginning of the Second World War and big
corporations had created jobs and kept prices down, and recognizing that there was
some apprehension over possible abuses of power inherent in big businesses).
91.
See Henry C. Simons, A Positive Program for Laissez-Faire: Some
Proposals for a Liberal Economic Policy, in ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 4-77
(1948); see also Henry C. Simons, The Requisites of Free Competition, 26 AM. ECON.
REV. 68, 70 (1936) (calling it "an obvious responsibility of the state ... to maintain the
kind of legal and institutional framework with which competition can function
effectively," and asserting that active control over the size of companies and structure
of the market was the most effective way to achieve this: "[Tihere must be vigorous and
vigilant prosecution of conspiracy in restraint of trade and, above all, through going
reform in corporation law. The right to charter large corporations must be vested
exclusively in the federal government; and the powers conferred on these legal
creatures must be carefully and narrowly limited."); JOHN BATES CLARK & JOHN
MAURICE CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS 187-88 (1912).
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strategies of monopolies were harshly punished. 92 The case of Alcoa
further demonstrated how the mere size of a company could
constitute a violation of the Sherman Act: Judge Learned Hand
argued that even if Alcoa did not misuse its monopoly power, the fact
that it was building capacity ahead of demand, put the company in a
position where it could engage in anticompetitive behavior, and this
was enough to constitute an antitrust infringement.9 3 The focus of
competition law had shifted from the inspection of conduct towards
structural issues, and the core of judicial evaluations lay in the
consideration of concentration rates and market shares.
From a theoretical perspective, the central tenet of Structuralist
thinking lay in the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm,
a method of analyzing competition first introduced by Edward Mason
that looked at the market structure of an industry in order to predict
conduct and performance in terms of pro- or anticompetitive
outcomes. 94 Mason's theory was advanced by Carl Kaysen and Donald
Turner, who argued that the goal of antitrust law was the protection
of the competitive process through the limitation of market power,
and explained that antitrust laws correcting conduct could not be
enough, because they were unable to deal with undue market power
95
that could not be related to distinct anticompetitive practices. Their
concern for preventing market concentration was grounded in
economic analysis arguments that inspected the breadth of the
market, the character of demand, the number and distribution of
sellers and buyers, entry barriers, and product differentiation. 96

Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939); United
92.
States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 254 (1940).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2nd Cir.
93.
1945) (ruling on what Herbert Hovenkamp defines as "arguably the most important
monopolization decision of the twentieth century, and the one that brought modern
economic analysis to postwar antitrust"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Book Review, 28 J.
INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY 158, 159 (1997)
COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA (1996)).

(reviewing RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ,

Edward S. Mason, Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale
94.
Enterprises, 29 AM. EcoN. REV. 61, 61 (1949); see also JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW
COMPETITION 182-204 (4th ed. 1967); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 430-68
(2d ed. 1959).
95.

See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC

AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 (1959) ("In our democratic, egalitarian society, large areas of
uncontrolled private power are not tolerated."). Kaysen and Turner do concede that
some situations make regulated monopolies necessary; for example, when the efficiency
of scale economies is at stake they look at economies of scale comparatively, in the
sense that the scale needed in order to be efficient can be created by many firms
together. Id. at 44-45. Note that Edward Mason wrote the preface.
See id. at 60, 110 (conceding that a broad definition of market structure
96.
could include the characteristic conduct of firms in a market and the presence of
practices that affect the creation or the maintenance of market power, showing that, to
a certain extent, reflections about conduct infiltrated their definition of structure); see
also Almarin Phillips, Competition, Confusion, and Commercial Banking, 19 J. FIN. 32,
32 (1964) (explaining how the application of the Stucturalist tools impacted even the
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Kaysen and Turner argued for divestiture as a remedy for excess
market power and expressed skepticism of any type of concentration
that was not accompanied by an explicit efficiency justification.9 7
The work of Joe Bain substantiated their empirical claim by
showing that structural situations characterized by high seller
concentrations and high barriers to entry were more conducive to a
worse performance. 9 8 Bain demonstrated that both these factors,
whether assessed independently or in combination, tended to be
connected with substantially higher rates of excess profits and had
therefore an adverse effect on market performance.9 9 On the basis of
some rudimentary data, Bain developed a dichotomy that predicted a
worse market performance when at least 70 percent of the market is
controlled by the eight largest firms. 00 He showed that firms with
large market shares have the ability to impose higher prices. 10 1
Overall Bain developed a model that demonstrated that good
performance was positively correlated with unconcentrated markets
and that avoided the transaction costs associated with the inspection
of conduct. 102

The scholarly debate was able to affect legislation in a direct
way. New merger policies were implemented with the 1950 CellerKefauver Act. 103 Celler-Kefauver extended the reach of merger
banking industry). Kaysen and Turner themselves classed the banking industry among
those industries for which conventional antitrust policy was inapplicable. See KAYSEN
& TURNER, supra note 95, at 42-43; see also United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 322, 363 (1963) (concluding that performance improves as the number of banks
increases: "Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an
undue percentage share of the relevant market and results in a significant increase in
the concentration of firms in that market is so inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that
the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects . . . 'competition is likely to
be the greatest when there are many sellers, none of which has any significant market
share."').

97.

KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 95, at 44-45.

98.

See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 94, at 204-06 (arguing

that both factors, whether assessed independently or in combination, tend to be
connected with substantially higher rates of excess profits and therefore have an
adverse effect on market performance).
99.
See id. at 372-429.
100.
Id. at 464; see also George J. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust
Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 182, 183 (1947) (suggesting that mergers creating market
shares of 10-20 percent are big enough to create a threat and should be closely
scrutinized by enforcement agencies).
101.

See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 94, at 464-68.

102.
See id.; see also Edward Mason, Market Power and Business Conduct:
Some Comments, 46 AM. EcON. REV. 471, 471-80 (1956) ("That market power is an
elusive quantity requires no demonstration before this audience. It is not possible nor
will it ever be possible, by calculating market shares, dividing price-minus-marginalcost by price, or other hocus pocus, to present an unambiguous measure of the degree of
monopoly. Market power has many dimensions ... it is probably desirable that these
judgments be economically sophisticated.").
103.
Giocoli, supra note 17, at 756; see also TEMP. NAT'L ECON. COMM., 77TH
CONG., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER 1 (1941).

VANDERBILTJOURNAL

1172

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW IVOL. 48:1147

controls policies considerably: whereas the old law, Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, only covered acquisitions of control by the purchase of
shares of stock, Celler-Kefauver also tackled mergers that proceeded
via the purchase of assets-thereby covering asset consolidations that
fell short of full market dominance.1 04 Furthermore, the old legal test
required that the anticompetitive effect be between the acquiring and
the acquired company, and courts could interpret it as not covering
vertical mergers since the effect of the vertical merger is not on the
merging parties.1 05 The new legal test inspected the likely impact of a
merger on competition "in any line of commerce in any section of the
country" and not only the potential impact of the merger on
competition between the two merging companies. 106 The first
important Supreme Court interpretation of the amended Section
came with the Brown Shoe decision where the Supreme Court
evaluated the merger in terms of market shares and applied economic
07
analysis to analyze the concentration.1 Furthermore, the Court
banned a merger that would occupy 7.5 percent of the relevant
market in Von's Grocery, and a merger with an even smaller
8
concentration percentage in the Pabst decision.10
The changes effected by Celler-Kefauver were fundamental: they
expressed a shift in the philosophy of antitrust law from setting rules
of conduct to the proactive control of changes in the market
structure.10 9 The main concerns behind this shift in attitude did,
however, go beyond market performance and the concentration of
economic power affected by the rise of monopolies: there was an acute
fear among government administrators that large corporations would
exploit their power politically and take over the executive role of the
state. 110 The concern for the political implications of these

Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 899, 38 Stat. 731, 734 (codified at
104.
15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1950)).
See Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 212 §7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at
105.
15 U.S.C. § 12 (2012)).
See id.
106.
See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
107.
See generally United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966);
108.
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
See, e.g., The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15
109.
U.S.C. § 18(a) (2012) (amending the Clayton Act by providing that before certain
mergers, tender offers or other acquisition transactions can close, both parties must file
a "Notification and Report Form" with the FTC and notify the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice); ALFRED R. OXENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET

PRACTICES 406-07 (1951); see also Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of
Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger Practice:A Case Study in the Law of
Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865,
878-80 (1997).
110.

See GEORGE J. STIGLER, FIVE LECTURES ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 46-59

(1949); M.A. Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration,33 REV. OF ECON.
& STAT. 269, 296 (1951) ("The extent of concentration shows no tendency to grow, and it
may possibly be declining. Any tendency either way, if it does exist, must be the pace of
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agglomerates of economic power was voiced by Senator Kefauver
himself:
[Tihe history of what has taken place in other nations where mergers and
concentrations have placed economic control in the hands of a very few people
is too clear to pass over easily .... It either results in a Fascist state or the
111
nationalization of industries and thereafter a Socialist or Communist state.

Senator Kefauver was concerned with the legitimacy of the
system and the need to maintain public faith and to prevent the
failure of a democratically elected government. When expressing his
concerns he certainly had in mind the outcome of dictatorial policies
in Europe.
B. Europe and the OrdoliberalSchool
It is difficult to imagine the application of American-style
competition laws to the European scenario, which had long been
dominated by a tradition of cartelization. In Europe, the application
of competition laws was marginal, because it was thought that
government-driven industry coordination was a more efficient
process-a resolution of the Inter Parliamentary Union defined
cartels as "natural phenomena of economic life." 112 To the very
limited extent that there were competition laws in place, rules were
vague, the use of administrative power discretionary, and the
enforcement soft. 113 Most European states had been following abusebased policies, which gave enforcement agencies wide discretion in
defining abuse of market power, a concept mainly understood in
terms of conduct causing harmful effects.1 14 However, the provisions
of the ECSC treaty now incorporated the prohibition of cartels, trusts,
and the restrictive practices of a system that envisaged the
aggressive enforcement of antitrust laws-a drastic innovation to the
European antitrust setting.
This section explains that the effectiveness of the transplant
depended on the presence of a stakeholder, the Ordoliberal School,
which was able to integrate the U.S. approach. The Ordoliberals
believed in rational principles that were compatible with the
American antitrust model. They endorsed liberal political values and
the creation of a social market economy, and had full confidence in

a glacial drift."); John Lintner & J. Keith Butters, Effect of Mergers on Industrial
Concentration, 1940-1947, 32 REV. OF EcoN. & STAT. 30, 30-31 (1950).
111.
96 Cong. Rec. 16452 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1950) (statement of Sen. Kefauver).
112.
Giocoli, supra note 17, at 764 n.53; see also GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note
17, at 8.
113.
See generally David J. Gerber, Law and the Abuse of Economic Power in
Europe, 62 TUL. L. REV. 58 (1987).
114.
See generally id.

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

1174

LAW [VOL. 48:1147

the advantages of a competitive system. 115 These principles could be
used to give a meaning to the new laws contained in the ECSC treaty
that was in line with the way Americans applied and understood
antitrust policy. When the Ordoliberals sought to influence the
transplanted law, the timing worked in their favor, the institutions in
charge of administering the competition policies of the EC were in the
process of being conceived, and that was helpful on two fronts. First,
they did not encounter resistance from existing power structures, and
second, it enabled them to capture positions within the developing
bodies in charge of applying the new law. U.S. officials backed their
efforts, because they understood that by supporting Ordoliberal
methods and actors they could succeed in their goal of importing a
free market system to Europe and open new avenues for American
companies.
Born during the interwar period at the University of Freiburg in
Germany, the Ordoliberal School developed into one of the principal
schools of thought on competition policy in Europe.1 16 The ideas
expressed in the Ordoliberal Manifesto of 1936 were intellectually
opposed to the centralization of economic power and the way this led
to social division and market disintegration that was typical of the
Nazi regime. During the war, the Ordoliberal public intellectuals who
refused to join Hitler's political party had their work censured and
were forced to leave their positions.11 7 With the fall of the Nazi
regime, there was a widespread need for fundamental changes, and
the Ordoliberals that returned to their offices were now in the

See DARIO VELO & FRANCESCO VELO, A SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY AND
115.
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC MONETARY UNION 57-59 (2013) (explaining Walter Rathenau's

influence on the foundation development of the social market economy); Rainer KIump
& Manuel Worsdorfer, An Ordoliberal Interpretation of Adam Smith, 61 ORDO:
JAHRBUCH FOR DIE ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAVT UND GESELLSCHAFT 29-51 (2010)
(examining works spanning from EUCKEN, DIE GRUNDLAGEN DER NATIONALOKONOMIE,
(1950) and GRUNDSATZE DER WIRTsCHAFl'SPOLITIK, (1952), to ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1776); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1869)); see also JEREMY BENTHAM,

,

A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (F.C. Montague ed., 1891) (1776).
See generally Doris Hildebrand, The European School in Competition Law,
116.
25 WORLD COMPETITION 3 (2002); David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizingthe Economy:
German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the "New" Europe, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 25
(1994).
FRANZ BOHM, WALTER EUCKEN & HANS GROSSMAN-DOERTH, THE ORDO
117.
MANIFESTO OF 1936 (1936). Starting in 1948 Boehm and Eucken founded the journal
ORDO: JAHRBUCH FUER DIE ORDNUNG UND WIRTSCHAFT UN GESELLSCHArr which is
still available today. The preface of the first volume (1948) at 11 said, "All we are
asking for is the creation of an economic and social order which equally guarantees
economic activity and humane living conditions. We call for competition because it can
be utilized to reach this goal-in fact the goal cannot be reached without it. It is a
means, not an end in itself." See also Constantin von Dietze, Die Universitat Freiburg
im Dritten Reich, 3 MITTEILUNGEN DER LIST- GESELLSCHAFT (1961); NILS
GOLDSCHMIDT, WALTER EUCKEN INSTITUT, ALFRED MUELLER-ALMACK AND LUDWIG
ERHARD: SOCIAL MARKET LIBERALISM 13 (2012).
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position to provide a coherent plan for reconstruction.11 8 They had
regained the political and intellectual liberty to influence policy, and
their plans to decentralize economic power in Europe were in
alignment with those of the Americans. As was their belief that only
once aggregations are broken could a system supportive of liberal
political values be put into place. 119
The Ordoliberals envisioned the introduction of a fundamentally
new model for economic growth in Europe aimed at restoring the
public's faith in the market and promoting social integration through
economic freedom and the belief in competition.120 In agreement with
the American
perspective,
Ordoliberalism
sharply rejected
monopolistic structures and cartel-dominated economies and drew
instead on the basic values of classical liberalism that supported the
introduction of a competitive economic system in an effort to enhance
prosperity and equity within society. 121 Their goal was to give
competition policies a constitutional dimension, so that citizens would
be constitutionally protected from distortions and abuses and could
gain the maximum benefits stemming from a free market.122 Erhard,
a committed Ordoliberal, envisaged a system in which the state was
responsible for setting up and constitutionally guaranteeing an
economic order, but not for controlling the economic process: "What I
am aiming at with a market economy policy is . . . to lay down the

order and the rules of the game." 123 This way, competition policy was
transformed into a constitutionally endorsed democratic principle
that protected individuals' freedom to do business. 124
The methodological approach of the Ordoliberals was broader in
scope than the Structuralist SCP paradigm in the sense that it went
beyond the inspection of market structure and the control over size,
but similarly it supported the use of interventionist practices to
suppress cartels and anticompetitive behavior. Its foundations can be
traced back to the work of Walter Eucken, an economist at the
University of Freiburg, who was convinced that economic systems

118.

A. J. NICHOLLS, FREEDOM WITH RESPONSIBILITY: THE SOCIAL MARKET

ECONOMY IN GERMANY, 1918-1963, at 151 (1994) (noting that Ludwig Erhard had to
leave the "Institute for the Economic Research" in 1942).
119.
Friedrich von Hayek, Die Uberlieferung der Ideale der Wirtschaftsfreiheit,
31 SCHWEIZER MONATSHEFTE: ZEITSCHRIFT FOR POLITIK, WIRTSCHAFT, KULTUR 337

(1951).
120.
121.
122

Id.
Id.
LEONHARD MIKSCH, WETTBEWERB ALS AUFGABE (1947); see also GERBER

supra note 17, at 256 (stating that "economic knowledge had to be translated into the
language of the law"); Giocoli, supra note 17, at 769-78.
123.

LUDWIG ERHARD, PROSPERITY THROUGH COMPETITION 102 (1958).

124.
See Friedrich A. Hayek, Wahrer un FalscherIndividualismus, ORDO 19-55
(1948) (explaining how competition policy transformed into an individual freedom).

1176

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 48:1147

must be guided by competition-enhancing principles. 125 Eucken
developed a doctrine named Ordnungspolitik, often translated as
"thinking in orders," in which he distinguished two main types of
fundamental economic orders. The "centrally administered" economic
order ensured that competition policy framed market processes at the
institutional level, and the "transaction economy" enabled individuals
to deal according to their own incentives.1 26 Even though individual
elements of their respective theories differed, the notions reflecting
the classical liberal ideal that competition is necessary for democracy,
and the wellbeing of society were in direct alignment with the
procompetition belief of the Structuralists.
The main intellectual innovation of the Ordoliberal School lay in
the idea of an economic constitution. The Ordoliberals thought that a
society's constitution had to establish the characteristics of its
economic order. A useful definition of economic constitution can be
found in the Manifesto itself: "[A] general political decision as to how
the economic life of the nation is to be structured."1 27 In a free market
economy where competition policy decisions constituted a major
pillar, the economic constitution was formed by the political and legal
128
decisions that characterized the market structure of a nation.
These constitutional choices were not meant to survive in a vacuum,
but after being translated into normative guidelines they had to be
implemented and made effective by a functional legal system.1 29 As
one commentator put it, "the principles enshrined in the economic
constitution should represent at the same time the source and the
constraint for the specific decisions made by governments and
legislators." 130 In short, economic theory was encapsulated in a
constitutional framework that was subsequently transformed into
enforceable legal norms.
How do constitutionally bounded economic principles regulate
economic conduct? Eucken distinguished between constitutive and
regulative principles. 131 Constitutive principles were fundamental
and had a constitutional dimension; examples are the freedom of
contract, the recognition of private property, and the protection of

125.

See WALTER EUCKEN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EcoNOMICS: HISTORY AND

THEORY IN THE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC REALITY 313-15 (T.W. Hutchison trans., 1950).
See id. To better tie the influence of this intellectual thought to what was
126.
happening on the European political stage, see generally NICHOLLS, supra note 118,
who explains that Ludwig Erhard was a student of Walter Eucken in Freiburg. Eucken
died in 1950 and never personally managed to bring his Ordoliberal ideas to bear in the
political scene, this was done by Erhard who pushed through the Ordoliberal thought
first from his position as Minister of Economic Affairs and later as Chancellor.
127.

117, at 24.
128.
129.
130.
131.

FRANZ BOHM, WALTER EUCKEN & HANS GROSSMAN-DOERTH, supra note

Id.
Id.
Giocoli, supranote 17, at 771.
WALTER EUCKEN, GRUNDSATZE DER WIRTSCHAFrSPOLITIK 254-291 (1952).
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open markets and competition.1 32 More specific regulation follows
therefrom in the form of workable legal norms, such as the
condemnation of abuses and monopolistic power.1 33 Through their
invention of the economic concept of constitution, the Ordoliberals
had found a coherent way to give a legal foundation to competition
policy that minimized governmental discretion. From that moment
onwards competition policies would institutionally frame market
processes. Legislators had little discretion in writing the law because
constitutive principles translated almost directly into legal measures,
and government's role was to enforce them.
Ordoliberal theory limited government's role to that of
maintaining conditions under which market prices, freely arrived at,
would allocate resources. Heavy-handed regulation and the control of
prices were abhorred, and competition was perceived as an
"instrument for disempowerment." 134 The Ordoliberals reasoned that
if governmental discretion was not limited by constitutive principles,
its intrusive involvement in controlling private contracts would lead
to rent-seeking: "Competition would not take place in the market, but
in the antechambers of government departments, and attempts at
monopoly are also made partly via these antechambers and partly
through the concentration of enterprises." 35 Specific reference was
made to the dangerous status of cartels that result from the collusion
of private and public power. 136 According to the Ordoliberals,
government's role was to enforce contracts wherever they reflected
individual freedom to trade and to refuse to enforce those inconsistent
with free decisions and allocative efficiency. The overriding goal of

Id.
132.
Id.
133.
134.
See Franz Bahm, Kartelle und Monopole im Modernen Recht, in
DEMOKRATIE UND OKONOMISCHE MACHT 22 (1961); see also Monopoly and Competition
in Western Germany, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEIR REGULATION

143

(1954) ("This mixture of free and controlled prices has great economic disadvantages,
particularly as officially controlled prices are at present, in Western Germany,
consistently lower than they would be in a free market. As a result, economic planning
in factories or in private households is vitiated. The demand for goods with officially
controlled prices is artificially inflated, with the result that they are squandered. The
profitability of the works producing these goods is artificially lowered, and their
equipment neither improved nor renewed. A scarcity of these goods then results,
bottleneck appear, and the government sees itself forced to ration such goods. On the
other hand, profits are high in the industries where prices are uncontrolled, profits are
reinvested in these industries
hiefly those producing consumption goods-whereas
the basic industries suffer from a notable lack of capital. Intervention is therefore
needed to divert the flow of capital from the consumption industries to the basic
ones.").
135.
See Monopoly and Competition in Western Germany, supra note 134, at
150.
136.
See, e.g., Franz Bohm, Das Problem der Privaten Macht: Ein Beitrag zur
Monopofrage, 3 DIE JUSTIZ 324 (1928); Franz Bbhm, Eine Untersuchungzur Fragedes
wirtschaftlichen Kampfrechts und zur Frage der rechtlichen Struktur der geltenden
Wirtschaftsordnung,in XI WETTBEWERB UND MONOPOLKAMPF (1933).
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competition policy was to maintain a constitutionally protected
individual freedom, so that efficiency would follow from agreements of
137
individual parties bargaining in their best interest.
To sum up, the new system envisioned by the Ordoliberals was
characterized by the maximization of individual freedom, confidence
in competitive markets and concern for state power, and these
principles could accommodate the American experience by reflecting
the rational principles and intellectual preferences applied in the
interpretation of antitrust laws by the Structuralist movement.
C. Capturing the U.S. Antitrust Transplant
This section explains that the German Ordoliberals emerged as
the winning stakeholders in capturing the transplant of U.S.
antitrust laws because they could define the transplanted provisions
in a way that would benefit its own constituency as well as the
United States. In addition, the moment of formation of the EC and
the flexibility of its institutional structure enabled the Ordoliberal to
assert themselves within a new regulatory framework thereby
securing long-term power and durable returns.
The present version of capture differs from modern capture
theory, which postulates that groups capture governmental positions
138
Ordoliberal actors were eager to
in order to maximize their wealth.
use their power for ideological, rather than wealth-transferring,
purposes. The benefits in the present case were not associated with
pecuniary gains or private benefits, but rather with the power
associated with holding office and bringing ideas to bear in public
practice. 139 The thirst for power was deeper than self-gratification;
the Ordoliberals had an ideological agenda that was silenced by the
advent to power of Hitler's party and throughout the war, and now
that they had gained back their positions their main goal was to
increase their ability to influence public policy in a direct way.
The Ordoliberal School was very influential in postwar Europe in
its efforts to put a new and workable system of competition into place.
One of the keys to the success of the Ordoliberal thought was its
sharpness and depth: all policy recommendations were given
intellectual strength and appeal by a novel and solid theoretical

137.
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See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 137-41

(1957); OLSON, supra note 13; Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371-98 (1983); Sam Peltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211-40 (1976); Richard
A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335-58
(1974); Stigler, supra note 50, at 3-21.
Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic
139.
Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 279-300 (1984).
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basis. Another reason for their achievements had to do with a
structural advantage in the political process; the transplant of U.S.
antitrust law occurred at the point in time when the institutions of
the EC were being conceived by a number of participants who were
not familiar with antitrust theory, and who therefore tried to secure
power by other means. This enabled the Ordoliberal School to seize
the opportunity to translate its principles into the new law and to
capture positions within the developing institutions to apply and
guide its application.
An additional factor that explains the influence of the
Ordoliberals was their deviation from other approaches to antitrust
present in Europe. The Ordoliberal thought on competition was very
different from the other mainstream approach to competition policy
in Europe, which placed more importance on the control of abuses of
big corporations. 140 The "abuse control" approach, which was
dominant in most European countries and which allowed for the
existence of cartels so long as no abusive practice could be discerned,
141
It lost to the
was not compatible with the Structuralist model.
Ordoliberal counterpart mostly because its reliance on the discretion
of authorities to find and regulate abuse was unsatisfactory in view of
The
concentrations.
existing
up
breaking
systematically
interventionist approach of the Ordoliberals, on the other hand, could
meet those goals. Given the symmetry between the Ordoliberal
approach and the American model, the Ordoliberals had higher
stakes in transposing their principles into the new law than its
opposition. And it is not surprising that the Americans chose to
cooperate with the constituency that supported an interpretation of
antitrust that was in line with their goals.
Further, the Ordoliberal School was the one stakeholder within
the importing body that was able to understand and interpret the
transplanted law in a way that endorsed, to a significant extent, the
intellectual approach to antitrust applied in the United States. The
Ordoliberal view that competition laws were to be used to prevent the
creation of monopolistic power did fit well with the prohibition-based
approach of the ECSC articles, and so did their keenness to prohibit
cartels and other power creating agreements. Overall, the
Structuralist and the Ordoliberal model had much in common: both
believed in no-fault standards and in the legal prohibition of
aggregations that wielded economic power. Both approaches
supported interventions towards dangerous concentrations, and both

See generally Gerber, supra note 113.
140.
See generally id.; Sigfrido M. Ramirez P6rez & Sebastian van de Scheur,
141.
The Evolution of the Law on Articles 85 and 86 EEC [Articles 101 and 102 TFEU]:
Ordoliberalism and its Keynesian Challenge, in THE HISTORIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU
COMPETITION LAW 19 (Kiran Klaus Patel & Heike Schweitzer eds., 2013).
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stood against the abuse approach in that the keystone of their
analysis lay in the mere presence of aggregations, not their behavior.
Such intellectual alignment made it possible for Americans as
well as the Ordoliberals to directly benefit from the transfer. Both
movements could sustain similar goals-namely dismantling the steel
cartels in the German Ruhrgebiet, which was in line with the goals
that the U.S. administration had in mind for postwar Europe and also
with the Ordoliberal philosophy of breaking up monopolies. The
Americans aimed to import their free market system to Europe to
facilitate the entry of U.S. business in the European market.
Conveniently, Ordoliberal values and principles could be easily used
and adapted to that end. 142 The promotion of a market-driven
economy was in the interest of both Europe and the United States,
and it was endorsed by the liberal principles enshrined in the
Ordoliberal economic constitution. In many ways, the deal worked on
a quid pro quo basis; U.S. officials were in a position to use the
Ordoliberal ideas in order to further their ends. Similarly, the ability
to influence the transplanted law gave the Ordoliberals the
opportunity to achieve their own goals and purposes.
Even if the intended outcomes of a working competition law
model were similar, Ordoliberal principles were intellectually closer
to the European situation than the American ones. The American
understanding of competition law could not fully account for one of
the major features of the European situation, the integration of a
European common market. 143 The U.S. model could provide a
satisfactory intellectual tool in that direction only partially, and this
was through its faith in a free market economy-and that was
important with respect to the unified Europe that Schuman and
Monnet had in mind, but not sufficient. The goal of the nascent
European competition laws was the elimination of restraints of trade
across national borders, and although the idea of European
integration did not come from the Ordoliberals, but from the group of
negotiators of the ECSC, their model provided a comprehensive and
well-grounded framework that could be applied to give form to legal
principles and institutions of the new union according to the general
political goals envisioned by its founders. Integration could further be
met by the constitutional dimension to competition law endorsed by
the Ordoliberals, as it would be conductive to an economic system
designed to prevent the creation of monopolistic power.

142.
GERBER, supra note 17, at 258 (arguing that besides of an outlet for
business, the United States also sought stability in view of the Cold war "The rupture
of co-operation between the Soviet Union and the other occupation authorities that led
to the 'Cold War' further intensified United States support for Ordoliberal proposals, as
economic structure and policy quickly became part of the East-West conflict").
143.
See generally Stephen Martin, The Goals of Antitrust and Competition
Policy, in ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 19 (2008); GIFFORD & KUDRLE,
supra note 17.
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The other claim that this case study makes is that the absence of
institutional power structures in Europe enabled the Ordoliberal
stakeholders to capture positions created for the law's administration
and influence policy. The intellectual background of the key actors of
the integration process initiated by the ECSC proves the point.1 44
German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, a committed Ordoliberal, was
one of the architects of postwar economic policy as well as one of the
driving forces behind the reform of competition law. 146 He was
particularly important because the Americans liked him, and this
facilitated their interactions. 146 Furthermore, the negotiations that
led the way to the Treaty of Rome, and which later established the
EC, were also guided by strong supporters of the Ordoliberal
intellectual force: Walter Halistein, who was appointed first president
of the European Commission, and Hans Von der Groben, who became
EC Competition Commissioner in 1963.1 4 7From his position as EC
Competition Commissioner, Von der Groben highlighted three
purposes of competition law: (1) the prevention to create barriers of
trade within the common market; (2) the creation of an economic and
social order based on the individual freedom of workers, businesses,
and consumers; and (3) the promotion of market integration as a
result of business decisions as opposed to government directives.1 48
The interaction of these three goals was intended to stimulate
economic activity and create a system of free competition in which
supply and demand would adjust automatically to technological
development within an integrated market place. 149 The strong
emphasis on individual freedom of action in a competitive
environment reflected the impact of the Ordoliberal thought on EC
competition law.
Overall, the new version of liberalism articulated in the
Ordoliberal model was instrumental to the successful formation of
competition policy in a new economic order. By placing economic
doctrine at the center of its intellectual framework, Ordoliberalism
succeeded in enhancing the value of competition rules, which up to
that moment in history had played a very minimal role in Europe,

See generally Brigitte Leucht & Mel Marquis, American Influences on EEC
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and put them at center stage of European integration. The European
competition policy provisions were successful for two reasons: first it
was clear that the adherence of the major European countries to
policies committed to the creation of a common market would bring
about greater efficiency and more rapid growth, and second, these
laws reached a constitutional level by setting out general
overreaching principles that could be absorbed gradually on two
levels: by the Commission and the European Court of Justice on one
level, and by the individual competition laws of member states that
were progressively converging toward Community competition law.1 50
Both processes played a central role in the advent of European
integration.

IV. TODAY'S DIVERGENCE AND PROTECTIONISM IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION

At present, U.S. antitrust and EC competition law operate quite
differently.1 51 U.S. antitrust policies influenced the development of its
European counterpart at its origin, but once the law was
transplanted, the Ordoliberals arose to turn the law in their favor
and guide its application and development.1 52 This last Part will
emphasize the importance that the Ordoliberal movement still has in
connection with the application of present-day competition policy in
the EC. The recent decisions in Microsoft and Google have shown that
when it comes to antitrust policy the European Commission can be
very harsh towards the anticompetitive practices of American
companies-there is a certain irony in this, given that the very
purpose of the introduction of U.S. antitrust laws in Europe was to
open up market platforms to facilitate the business of U.S.
companies.

150.
Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R 1 9 (where the ECJ established the conditions for the direct
applicability of EC law); Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R 585 (establishing the
conditions of primacy of EC law in case of conflict with national law); Case 6/72
Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co Inc v. EC Commission, 1973 E.C.R 215
(examining exclusionary abuses of power affecting the structure of a market); Joint
Cases 142/84 & 156/84 BAT & Reynolds v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R 4487 (examining
concentrations); see also Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 OJ (L 1) (confirming that
Arts 101, 102 TFEU are directly applicable in member states by virtue of the above and
other case-law as long as the agreements restricting competition affect the trade
between member states and mergers have a EU dimension).
See generally GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supranote 17.
151.
See Peter Behrens, The Ordoliberal Concept of Abuse' of a Dominant
152.
Position and Its Impact on Article 102 TFEU, in ABUSE REGULATION IN COMPETITION
LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH ASCOLA CONFERENCE TOKYO (2015) (arguing that

the Ordoliberal approach was not monolithic but could instead adapt to social changes
to remain relevant after the transplant).
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In the past decade, U.S. antitrust authorities have been
relatively lenient in connection with antitrust enforcement. The
change in attitude came as the consequence of the so called "antitrust
revolution" of the 1970s, when vigorous enforcement was replaced by
a more laissez-faire disposition to antitrust disputes, when the
Chicago approach to competition policy substituted Structuralism,
and when the distrust towards monopolies was replaced by economic
efficiency arguments. 5 3 The Chicago approach rested on the fact that
markets exhibit a spontaneous tendency to reach Pareto efficient
results, provided they are not interfered with by exogenous factors,
like antitrust actions.154 Today the U.S. approach to antitrust relies
on a more nuanced form of the Chicago approach, introduced by the
so-called post Chicago scholars, who not only continue to base their
arguments on efficiency, but also take into account game theory,
innovation, consumer choice, and the ability of regulators to intervene
in the presence of market failure. 15 5 However, since Nobel Laureate
Ronald Coase articulated the damage that can be caused by courts'
erroneous conclusions that given practices are anticompetitive (when
in fact they are not), authorities became more deferential towards
antitrust issues, especially in connection with novel business
practices or products whose scope is not yet evident. 156
On the other hand, the approach to competition policy in the EC
never abandoned the inclination to control competition practices
through the regulatory process, and by doing so it maintained a
strong belief in the principles inherited from the Ordoliberal
tradition. When the United States started to place greater faith in
markets and refrained from regulating the so-called "false positive"
practices, the EC continued to show greater confidence towards
interventionist procedures.15 7 At times it exposed itself to the costs of
erroneously regulating behavior that may have led to positive results,
the so-called "false negatives."158 The continued commitment to shape
competition through intervention confirms that Ordoliberal principles

153.
Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 925-28 (1979).
154.
Id.; see also Melvin Reder, Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change,
20 J. ECON. LIT 1, 11 (1982).
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155.
REV. 1911, 1923-29, 1933 (2009).
Ronald H. Coase, supra note 20, at 67 ("One important result of this
156.
preoccupation with the monopoly problem is that if an economist finds something - a
business practice of one sort or other - that he does not understand, he looks for a
monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly
explanation, frequent.").
Bradford, supra note 9, at 20; see also Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 4-9
157.
(articulating the limits of antitrust and the damage that can be caused by courts'
erroneous conclusions that a given practice is anticompetitive when in fact it is not).
Bradford, supra note 9, at 20.
158.
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were not just instrumental in shaping the policies of the nascent
European Union, but that they account for much of the way European
competition policy is still understood and applied to this day. This in
turn explains why, when the European Commission and the FTC
investigate the same transaction, most times the application of EC
competition standards will result in stricter sentences and penalties,
regardless of whether the transaction deals with mergers or abuse
issues.
In terms of mergers, on several occasions EC authorities
intervened to stop mergers that had previously been approved by U.S.
authorities. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas was one such case. 159
Even though the Department of Justice had already cleared the
merger, the European Commission expressed serious concerns about
the strengthening of Boeing's existing position and imposed a
considerable number of conditions before granting its approval.1 60 In
other cases, the Commission blocked mergers between U.S.
companies altogether. This happened, for instance, when it denied
General Electric's request to merge with Honeywell International,
holding that the short-term efficiencies that the merger would create
would drive out European competitors and enable the merged entity
to extract higher prices from consumers in the longer term.161 The
transaction in this case had also previously been cleared by U.S.
authorities.1 62 This particular decision was held to be legally nondivisible because General Electric saw no benefit in merging with
Honeywell and restricting its operations to the U.S. market. 163
Currently another merger involving General Electric is under
investigation, and although a final decision has not yet been taken,
the Commission explicitly voiced its concerns on how the transaction
will raise prices, diminish customer choice, and reduce overall
research and development investments.1 64 Other recent merger cases
involving U.S. companies, including Cisco/Tandberg, UTC/Goodrich,
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Case No: IV[M. 877-Boeing/ McDonnell Douglas, Commission Decision of
July 30, 1997, 1997 O.J. (L336/16).
160.
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avoidance of double marginalization in supplier-purchaser transactions).
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(archived Oct. 5, 2015).
Bradford, supra note 9, at 20.
163.
European Commission Press Release IP/15/4478, Mergers: Commission
164.
Opens In-depth Investigation into General Electric's Proposed Acquisition of Alstom's
Energy Businesses (February 23, 2015).

2015]

CAPTURING THE TRANSPLANT

1185

and Google/Motorola Mobility, were approved by the Commission in
an attempt to cooperate with U.S. authorities-but ultimately the
approval of those mergers was made conditional on the
implementation of extensive conditions that materially affected the
operations of U.S. companies in Europe as well as globally.1 65
Also in connection with abuse of dominance cases, the
Commission's rulings have had a significant impact on the way U.S.
companies conduct their business. 66 The most significant decisions in
this ambit involve innovation-intensive industries and platform
economies where the network effects are strong, facilitating the
formation of monopolies and raising entry barriers for competitors.
These industries are characterized by high fixed costs to produce a
new technology, such as investment in intellectual property and
skilled labor and low marginal production costs. 1 6 7 The landmark

case where the Commission forced a U.S. company to adjust its
conduct to European competition law standards is the Microsoft
decision.1 68 Holding that Microsoft was abusing its dominant position
by not sharing its programming interface with third party companies,
the Commission ordered Microsoft to pay fines amounting to more
than $2.3 billion, in addition to changing key elements of its
operating software to enable interoperability with other systems. 6 9
The Commission hit the company again in 2009, this time claiming
that by tying Internet Explorer to the Windows platform Microsoft
failed to give Europeans a browser choice, and fined the company an
additional $751 million.' 7 0 The tying of Internet Explorer to Windows
was at the core of the Microsoft case when it was first brought in the

165.
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practices). Intel reached a separate settlement with the FTC in 2010 where they agreed
not to give computer makers discounts or other inducements in exchange for promises
they will buy chips exclusively from Intel. See Intel COMP/C-3/37.990.
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Research, Working Paper No. 8268, 2001).
168.
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Microsoft had to pay an initial fine of $794 million in 2004); European Commission
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United States, where an appellate decision, overturning the order of a
district court, released Microsoft from antitrust violation charges once
the company made a commitment to share its programming interface
with third party browsers. 171 It has often been argued that the U.S.
172
court protected Microsoft's attempt to incentivize innovation.
The Microsoft case suggests that the European Commission is
likely to intervene when it fears that the extension of monopolies
from one platform to another will foreclose the entry of potential
competitors, especially when the first platform benefits from a socalled "network advantage." In particular, the Commission seemed
worried that Microsoft was going to leverage its power in the software
market into other platforms such as the browsers market, as well as
the market for media players, thereby foreclosing competition in the
latter ones. Such leveraging practices are dangerous for competition
because they enable dominant players to use their market power in
one market to break into other distinct markets, thereby restricting
competition and raising prices in secondary markets. In making
determinations in the platform economy, the European Commission
had sometimes distinguished between cases where the creation of a
new product was at issue, as opposed to the enhancement of
competition in an existing market. 173 In the Microsoft scenario,
opening its operating system to rivals' browsers implies the latter,
whereas enabling interoperability with alternative ways to consume
digital media implies the former. The Commission failed to articulate
this distinction; it forced Microsoft to do both-provide a version of
Windows that enabled the choice of alternative browsers and that
was not tied to its Media Player-hoping that by doing so it would
stimulate competition in these secondary platforms. 174 By doing so,
the Commission implied that the innovation that would flow from
for
compensated
competition
to
platforms
new
opening
disincentivizing original platform carrier's innovation efforts. Overall
its decision, as well as the heavy fines, had a forceful impact on
176
Microsoft's worldwide operations.
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Another tech giant, Google, is likely to be the next victim of the
Commission's strict policing efforts. Since 2010, Google has been the
subject of active investigations in both the United States and the EC,
and their respective reasons for concern match quite closely. The
centerpiece of both complaints related to the way Google displays its
search results: Google was accused of abusing its dominant position
in the online search market by reserving unfavorable treatment to
vertical search service providers compared to Google's own sponsored
vertical search results. 176 Google was said to be giving undue
preference to its products by highlighting them through biased
listings and displaying its own reviews of restaurants and other
services more prominently than the ones of other providers like Yelp,
OpenTable, etc. 177 Additionally, there were concerns related to the
way Google was "scraping" content from those competing providers,
using content without permission in its own offerings, and delivering
advertisements.1 78 On January 3, 2013, the FTC held that Google's
practices were not anticompetitive.1 7 9 The FTC essentially supported
Google's argument that its system benefitted consumers and that
"any negative impact on actual or perceived competitors was
incidental to that purpose."1 8 0 Once Google had made a voluntary
commitment to refrain from using content of other websites and
agreed to remove some restrictions related to advertising, the fivemember U.S. Commission unanimously voted to close the
investigation without bringing charges.' 8
In Europe, after five years, Google's antitrust investigation is
still open. Since 2010 Google proposed three settlements, all of which
were rejected.1 82 In April 2015, the Commission issued a set of formal
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charges, known as a statement of objections, outlining its concerns
that Google's monopoly power in general online searching will carry
over to vertical searching and that this will foreclose competition in
the latter market. 183 To support the Commission's position, the
European Parliament recently passed a resolution calling for the
"unbundling [of] search engines from other commercial services." 184
What is going to happen next is uncertain; if Google fails to rebut the
charges it is likely to face a break-up order as well as a fine of up to
10 percent of its global annual revenue. 185 Alternatively, Google can
submit another settlement hoping that the Commission will accept it.
Given the previous rejections, any new settlement would need to
18 6
quite radically change the way the company operates in Europe.
The Commission and Google's adversaries will try to extract as many
concessions as they can. If a settlement is finally endorsed, Google
will have escaped heavy fines and the finding of abuse of its dominant
position. Google will, however, still be stuck with the costs of
maintaining a different face in Europe, and such costs will have a
deep impact on Google's future operations.' 87
So far it is unclear whether the actions of the Commission have
enhanced competition as they purported to, or whether they have
tried to protect the operations of local businesses. Balancing efficiency
against monopoly when applying antitrust laws is an inherently
difficult task, especially when technology companies relying on
network effects are at issue. History, as well as the theoretical
literature relating to competition and innovation, remains insufficient
at determining which antitrust practices will ultimately encourage
innovation. 188 In many ways, antitrust action has shaped the
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technology that characterizes the dynamic economy of the twentyfirst century, but it is unclear whether innovation could have found a
way to express itself without the help of competition laws.1 89 It is also
unclear whether monopolies in network effects economies should be
treated as entry barriers, and therefore fragmented, or treated as
major means to achieve technological advance, and therefore
tolerated. What is clear is that major global players in the world's
economy had to incur significant costs in order to adjust their
standards to the ones set out by European competition law. By
requesting differentiated products, it looks as if the Commission is
trying to protect the European market from competitive outside
forces rather than making European companies competitive at a
global level.

V. CONCLUSION

This Article has shown that legal transfers almost never head in
a direction the transplanting institution can foresee and that the fate
of a new legal measure in foreign territory remains an uncertain one.
Constructions of different legal realities place rules in different
settings that do affect their interpretation. This Article has argued
that similar legal provisions will hardly ever develop in the same
rule, because interest groups within the importing body will
inevitably influence them, and that the role of such groups is
fundamental to the evaluation of a transfer into a new regulatory
system. The transfer discussed in the Article was ultimately effective
because it involved a transfer into a new regulatory system at its
inception and was supported by a stakeholder that could utilize it in a
way that induced an internal process of legal development that was
welcome and needed.
The present discussion has also uncovered a protectionist
attitude of the European Commission towards the European common
market. Sixty-five years ago the United States transferred their
antitrust laws to Europe in order to open up market platforms that
would facilitate the business of U.S. companies, but eventually their
objectives did not succeed, as modern day EC competition policy is
mainly inhibiting the way U.S. companies operate, and U.S.
companies are increasingly uncomfortable about it. Whether and
when antitrust laws are used as trade barriers-especially in the
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context of platform economies-will be the topic of further research,
especially since the EC's protectionist attitude may also be followed
by forming regional entities in Latin America, South and East Africa,
and the Caribbean, where several states are the process of
negotiating trade policies and the regulation of competition' 90-and
by China, which has recently passed its own antitrust laws.1 9 1 A
closer look at local stakeholders will help articulate which direction
those developing policies are headed and determine if the threat to
the operation of global companies is a real one.
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